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This Paper deals with a coalition proble=l involved in the water develoP―
ment and conservation by different inuniciPalities. Local interests confliCting
among different municipalities concern (1)the attainment of economic effici―
ency,(りprOViSiOn of needed amount of water, and(3)regulatiOn of water
POllutiOn,Possible coalition patterns formed by municiPalities are exanined
by the use of a game theoretic aPproaCh・ The paper includes a case study on
the Kakogとwa River Basin in Hyogo Prefecture, whereby the practicability of
the approach is validated.
l lntroductio■
Vヽiti the impetus of increasing complexties of、v ter‐elated activities and gro、ving
deterioration of water resources environment, there is a growing concern and need
for the development and conservation of water resourcessystems, A conspicuous prob‐
lem which demands a practical solution then is an effective coordination of local
血terests which conflict amOng different municipalities. The interests of each muni‐
cipality concern ① th  attainment of economic efficiency, ② proviSi(】i of needed
amount of water, and ① regul tion of water pollution。
The coordination of the conflicting interests can be approached by t、vo kind of
systems. One concerns a coordination by the third sector(any existi4g agency of a
higher level or some provisional authority)whiCh Vヽorks out an a bitration proposal。
The other is a solution‐finding by the party concerned,which forms a coalition where
it is found to be preferable to the party. The c∞rdina ion problem of the former
type can be modeled by goal progranllning approach as has already been studied by
the authorit'2),3)
This paper approaches the latter problem by usc of game theory and presents a
mathematical formulation of the problem4)The mathematical mOdel thus obtained
will be applied to the study area of the Kakogawa River Basin in]Hyogo Prefecture,
帝hereby the practicability and potential of the methodology will be vindicated.
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2  ProblelrL Identification
(1)We deal with a coalition probleln mvolved in the development and utiliZation
of urban water systems by three municipalities which are assumed to be located
on the same streani ; one on the upstreanl, one on the middlestreanl,  and the other
on the downstream.
(2)The eXplicit goal of each municipality concerns the IIniniinization of the assOci‐
ated costs subject to an established set of restrictions(1)tO the provisiorl of needed
amount of water and (2)to the regulation of water pollution.
(3)The feasible patterns of coalition are (1)Separate implementation of proiectS
by cach municipality onO COalition),(2)ioint ilnplementaticJn of proiects between
the upstream and middlestream municipalities, C)betWeen the middlestream and
doMlstream municipalities,and (4)between all the municipalities(entire coalition).
(4)The abOVe coalitions are considered as a three‐person (or tWO‐persoll)coopera_
tive game whose players are municipalities.
(5)For each type of coalition the party concerned attempts to find the optilnal
strategy to minimize the costs associated with the development and conservation of
combined Φr Separate)urban water systems,
(6)frhis prOblem can be formulated as a nonlinear progranllning problem as will
be secn later.
If the total costs are found to be reducible with the coalition, the party's concern
is whether it pays to each player in the party, It depends on how to allocate the
total costs to each player in the party, This kind of cost allocation problem can
be studied by use of the concepts of θο″ο developed by Bondareva,5)sLapley。) and
scarf,7)and力ι″″ι′due to Peleg,8)Davis and Ⅲlaschler.。) This will be discussed
later.
3  Model Formulatio■ of Coalition Strategy
3.l Constraints
Letグ(ブ,力)t Srepresent three(tWO Or one)players(muniCipalities)in a giVen coalition S.
For municipahtyゲ(ゲ = 1,2,3;1=upstream,2=nliddlestream, 3=downstream),
the opti4nal Strategy is forttulated as follows。(The nOnnegativity conditions for all
the variables are omitted here.)
Available amount of streamflow to be collected is constrained as
,ど≦イー Fi
″テ :amount of collection=amount of water supply (variable)
(1)
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?; :amOunt of streamflow at the farthest upstream point (variable)
為 i amOunt of minimum discharge reserved(COnstttit)
Water supply condition is formulated as:
Dサ Dー'≦π,+F(ノ″―ノカ)+ぱ(チ =ブ,力(S)      伊)
夕′, (ノ″):amOunt Of purified water distributed to(frO■1)municipality ゲ from (to)
チ(Variable)
″】:amount of renovated wastewater reused for water use in municipalityゲ(variable)
Dデ :water demalld in municipahtyゲ
D::exiSting water demand(conStttts)
Wastewater treatments are so regulated i
イ=島―平⑫ヵ―Ъ♪0=ズのくめ
",′
≦ Dゲ
ク′す≦ D,(サ=ブ (力)(S)
クサ,(%舟):amOunt Of wastewater transported froni municipality ガ(′)tOチ(ガ)
undergoes secondary treatinent
(3)
④
(5)
whe e t
(6)
(9)
(10)
ケ*locat‐
R    7   E
″    ==  ぞ炒   ――  η
AI    R    0
ω    ==  aク   Ⅲ―‐  2ク
ηF i amOunt of wastewater treated in
ωF i treated wastewater which fllrther
紗F
ηギ
(7)
the second ry process(Variable)
lll■dergoes tertiary treatment = amount
of renovated waste、vater (variable)
treated、vastewater to be discharged into the receiving、vater body (vari_
able)
renovated 、vaste、vater to be reused for water use (variable)
Y:renOvated wastewater to be discharged into the receiving water bodyω?
(Variable)
Streamf10w condition is expressed as :
?I=ヲ 傲
'十
巧 )一汗角′o′ =ブ励 朝 ⊂島 )  ①
?:= o
D   L
T,=?す*
?::amOunt of streamfbw at the farthest downstream m mШ掩ゃaltty
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ed nearest above municipalityゲ(var able)
yす :set of those municipalities located farther upstream from nillnicipalityゲ
(giVen α ″´ゲο″ゲ)
O i amOunt Of streamflow in the headwaters(constttt given,″ゲθ/ケ)
Streamf10w quality is regulated as i
う:≦B:
う:=|うI(?I―為)+Bβぽ+♂ω
')う戸= う子
う:i Streamflow quality(BOD)at the farthest downstream
(Variable)
at the farthest upstream (variablc)
streamf10w quahty stalldard(BOD)presCribed α /´ゲο″ゲ
water qulity(BOD)of ω,(COnstant)
う7
B,
EB
(11)
(12)
(13)
in muniicipalityゲ
(COllStant)
B° :that of ″子 (COnstant)
3.2 0bjective Functio■
The objective function is identified as the■liniinizat on of the total costs, which
is formulated as :
Minimize zttΣ(α,(イ,)十′島,ボ温″(ノ丁′)+βサ,(ノす.)+γす′(Ъr)十γr,(Ъゲ))
十 Σδ子⑫好)}
デー 7〕β,R,0,Ⅳ
α,(″F)'β,ザ (ノ舟)'β′す(ノ″),γゲ′(竹ど),γ″(埼J),δ子(″F):cost functions with
respect to"′み,ノぢ,,"″,%′ゲ'初子(デ=7,E,■0,め,reSpect?ly.
(14)
3.3 Solution Algorithm
The above formulated mOdel is a class of nonlinear programming problem 、vith
a specific property that a small number of equations are nonlinear(obieCtiVe func‐
tion (12),and Equation (10))While the others are linear.
This observation allows us to combine the method of feasible directions due to
ZoutendijkiO)and the penalty fIInctlon method developed by Fiacco.・) For details of
this algorithm developed by the author, see references(1),(2)and (3).
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4 Cost A1location by Galxle Theory
We now arrive at the discussion of cost allocation based on the notions developed
in the field ofュ‐pers n cooperative games.
The process is initiated by the completion of an inventory of thc associated costs
for a set of possible coalitions with an aid of the above formulated mathematical
model. Let these costs be denoted by c (S)WhiCh iS a functioll of coalition S, For
convenience of calculation ttis function is normalized for eactt type ef coalition.That
iS,
υ(S)=ΣC(S)―C(S)
'く
S
(13)
This normalized function which is called a characteristic function of coalition S
represents the reduced cost derived froni coalition S. This set of characteristic
functions define the formulation of n‐person cooperative game (どWζ υ)。 We shall dis‐
cuss the assignment of the reduced costs to cach player of the party. In terms ofュ‐
person cooperative game,this kind of assignment problenl is identified as the deter‐
mination of pay‐f vector(為)WhiCh represents a set of assigned portions of the
reduced cost to playerゲ. Vヽe shall discuss the applicability of the notion of core or
kernel.
4.l Assignment based on the Notion of Core
A vector of pay‐f levels is suggested which is feasible for all of the players
acting collectively,and an arbitrary coalition is examined to see whether it can pro‐
vide higher pay‐off levels for a1l of its members. If this is possible, he pay‐of
vector which was originally suggested is said to be blocked by tte coalition. The
core of the n‐person game consists of those pay‐off vect rs which are feasible for
the entire group of players and which can be biocked by no coalition. The core of
he n‐persorl game is defined by the following two constraints,
厨Ⅳズ,=υ(N)
(14)
(15)
Equation (15)is the expression of the “individual rationality'' which means the
condition that anテco lition S⊂ZV sとould guarantee such an imputed pay‐off(red c
COSt)tO each member of the party that would never come under the lowest level of
available pay‐off produced from cOalition d Equation (15) formulates the “group
rationality"which means that he entire pay‐offs derived from cOalition ハr should
completely be imputed to all the members。
The feasible solution to he above problenェwhich is called a くtimputation"consti‐
澤sズ1≧υ(3)
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tutes a convex set as sho、vn in Fig. 1.  This means that the concept of core
connot specify a unique assignment (llnputation) alternative, alhough it reduces
the number of feasible alternatives, For this purpose we proceed in the following
manner by use of the concept of kernel,
4.2 AssignlxRent based on the Notion of Kernel
Let S be an arbitrary coalition. The excess of S witt respect to the outcome of
game β is                                 ヽ
θ(S)=υ(S)―鳥X手
The excess of S therefore represents the
total amOunt that the members of S gain Φr
lose, if ι(S)<0),if they withdraw from
the outcome of game β and fOrln the coall‐
tion S.
The notion of kernel is defined as the
Hliniinization of the maxilnal excess of S.
For a three‐person game, the point of ker‐
nel,下iS identified as shoWn in Fig.1.
This can be extended to an n‐person game
as given below.
(16)
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正=島+毛許⑫の一F滸ち)' (17) Fig.1.滑潔階露撃翼乱蓼出警mel f°r
where t,ゲdenotes a degrec of contribution
to the entire coalition,
5 Case Study
The study area is identified as the Kakogawa River Basin in Hyogo Prefectureo The
inputs are estilnated through a cbse scrutiBy of practical conditions relatel to the
development and conservation of the water resources systems, Some of them aFe
shown in Figs.2 and 3.                      1
The calculated associated costs for each coalition are listed in Table I. On this
basis the characteristic functions are obtained as shown in Table II. The results
of cost allocations derived fro■l th  combined application of the concepts of core
and kernel are listed in Table III.  The study of this table sho、vs:
(1)The reduced costs are allnost the same for both the upstream and Hliddle‐
streanl municipalities,、vhereas those for the downstrearn municipality amountto three
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Table I. Associated Costs for each coa■tion (103 Yen/yeaつ
40553.4
Table II. Characteristic FunctiOn for each coalition
7( 1)=79)=7(3)=0,0
7(1り=1182.09
7(2の=4193,77
7(13)=4160.54
7(123)=8755。58
Table III. Costs anocated tO each れauniCiPality for the entire coaユニtion
IUpStr∝
m Downstreaml
lmmttm
11283.4 32445,0 49308.9
-1936.8  1
40553.3
times as n■uch as the former.
(2)This Seems to be derived from the fact hat the attainment of econoHlic effici‐
ency depends largely on the participation of the largest party (dOWnstteani munici‐
pality)in the coalition。
(3)「rhis is also explained by the analysis of Fig. 4, which shows the consistency
of the water utilization pattern for the upstream municipality irrespective of the
coalition patterns.
(4)This implies that the entire coalition is essentially effective to the do、vn tream
(106 Yen/year)
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242.8
Casc.l          Casc,2
Fig. 4 calculated water utilizaiion Patterns
municipality.
(5)It is preferable also to the upstream and downstreani nlllnicipalities, because
it turns that the streamfiow regulations are co■llnitted totally to the downstream
municipality,thus resulting in an increased availability of the amOunt of collection
in the upstream and middlestreani municipalities.
(6)To sun■ p, the entire coalition with the allocation of the associated costs
based on the notions of core and kernel, is preferable to all the municipalities.
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6 Conclusion   t
The central question of this paper has been addressed tO a coalition proble■■i ‐
volved in the water development and conservation by different municipalities. The
paper discussed the potentialiand applicability of an n‐person cooperative game to
the analysis of effective coalition patterns available to the party concerned. The
case study on the Kakogawa River Basin has revealed the practicability of the rnetho・
dology in planning areawide multi‐modal water resources utilization systems,
In light of these considerations the presented methodology represents a fruitful
research approach, although it has to await further development and revision of
the approach such as the quantification of utility levels to be incorporated in the
pay‐off vector.
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